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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-3075 
____________ 
 
CHRISTIAN ARAUJO, 
    Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A206-704-949) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Quynh V. Bain 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and STENGEL, District Judge.* 
 
 
(Filed: March 29, 2017) 
                                                   
 * The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Christian Araujo petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denying his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT). We will dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
I   
A native of the Dominican Republic, Araujo entered the United States without 
authorization in 1989. On June 20, 2014, he was convicted in federal court of possession 
with intent to distribute n-benzylpiperazine and methamphetamine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Araujo was subsequently ordered removed under 8 
U.S.C. § 1228(b) (governing removal proceedings for aggravated felons under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). He conceded to the Immigration Judge (IJ) that he was removable 
as an aggravated felon, but he sought deferral of removal under CAT. 
The IJ denied Araujo’s request for CAT protection, finding that the record did not 
demonstrate a “clear probability that [Araujo] would be tortured with the acquiescence of 
the Dominican Republic.” App. 18. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that Araujo “did not meet his heavy burden to show a likelihood of . . . 
torture” upon removal. App. 6. 
                                                   
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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II 
The IJ had jurisdiction to determine Araujo’s eligibility for CAT protection and 
the BIA had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e). 
We typically have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). However, because Araujo is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
as an aggravated felon, our review is limited to constitutional and legal questions. 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D).  
Araujo does not explain whether he is raising a constitutional or legal question. 
Instead, he challenges the IJ’s factual findings, insisting that it is “more likely than not 
[that he will] be tortured if removed to the Dominican Republic at the hands of [] 
criminal gangs and corrupt police officials.” Araujo Br. 15. He claims that the IJ and BIA 
erred in finding that his work as a Dominican police officer did not support a conclusion 
that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured. In essence, Araujo disagrees with 
the IJ about what is likely to happen to him if he is removed. This is a factual question 
precluded by § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). 
So too with Araujo’s argument that the IJ erred in finding that the Dominican 
Republic was unlikely to acquiesce in his torture. We have held that the question of 
whether a foreign government will acquiesce in torture—the issue on which the IJ 
focused most of her opinion—is a “factual determination,” not a legal or constitutional 
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question. Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012) (excluding the question 
of potential foreign-government acquiescence from review under § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D)).  
In sum, Araujo does not raise any claim that the Agency misapplied the law, 
applied the wrong standard of review, or deprived him of constitutional rights. He merely 
claims that the evidence was weighed incorrectly. We have long recognized that claims 
“that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed evidence . . . are not 
questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we must dismiss Araujo’s petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  
